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There is little scholarly agreement about how to understand the relationship between 
Adam Smith and Edmund Burke. Philosophical commentators often see the two in fundamental 
opposition, reading Smith’s Wealth of Nations as precisely the sort of unflinching, systematic 
critique of existing society which Burke is held to have so abhorred.
1 There is much truth to this; 
Smith himself described his magnum opus as ‘a very violent attack… upon the whole 
commercial system of Great Britain’.
2 Yet historians point out that Smith and Burke were 
personal friends who not only shared a sentimental attachment, but also considered themselves to 
be in fundamental agreement on most philosophical and political issues. Burke repeatedly 
praised Smith’s writings as both beautiful and true, not only in his conversation and in his 
correspondence, but also in at least one published review. For his part, Smith is alleged to have 
commented that Burke ‘was the only man, who, without communication’ thought on topics of 
political economy ‘exactly as he did’.
3 Scholars must confront the fact of this mutually 
recognized similarity in viewpoints before describing Smith as fundamentally anti-Burkean or 
Burke as fundamentally anti-Smithian.
4  
We must be careful, however, not to replace one unduly reductive thesis on this subject 
with its equally reductive opposite.
5 The record of their interaction does no more to support the 
thesis that Burke and Smith were in full agreement than it does to support the view that they 
were in full disagreement.
6 If nothing else, it forces us to recognize that Smith and Burke lived 
very different lives, and as a result engaged in very different modes of thinking and writing.
7   2 
This difference between both the biographies and the philosophies of Smith and Burke is best 
captured by noting that the former was primarily an academic, and the latter primarily a 
politician, albeit one with philosophical predilections. This essay will argue that Burke’s and 
Smith’s respective understandings of their different social roles are central both to the complex 
relationship between their respective worldviews and to their deep mutual admiration. For Burke, 
Smith was always the model of a wise philosopher. For Smith, Burke grew into the model of a 
prudent statesman. 
The contrast between the philosopher and the statesman was a constant theme for Burke 
and Smith alike. They shared an opposition to the ‘man of system’, the hybrid 
philosopher/statesman who attempts to shape actual societies according to some preconceived 
theoretical model. The man of system, both argue, is enchanted by the aesthetic appeal of his 
imagined ideal society, and is made blind to the suffering which occurs in the futile attempt to 
actualize this ideal. Yet while Smith joins Burke in warning against the dangers of sublime and 
beautiful systems, Smith does not refrain from constructing systems of his own. Indeed, both The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations contain intricate intellectual systems. In 
the reviews of both these works in Burke’s Annual Register, Smith’s systems are lauded for their 
remarkable degree of beauty and sublimity.
8 As a result, it is entirely possible to be caught up in 
the aesthetic enchantments of Smith’s systems, and to become a man of system blind to the 
suffering that the actualization of Smith’s theories may bring.  
With his evident enthusiasm for the aesthetic aspect of Smith’s philosophy, Burke is 
particularly vulnerable to becoming such a dangerous utopian. And in his posthumously 
published Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, the great opponent of philosophical systems reveals 
that, for at least a moment, he has indeed fallen prey to their aesthetic allure. Burke here calls for   3 
the implementation free market policies with dogmatic zeal, regardless of the consequences, 
equating the laws of the market with the commands of God. The power of his Smith’s ideas were 
such that they could, with terrible irony, turn a man of refined aesthetic sensibility like Burke 
into precisely the sort of man of system Burke himself is so famous for opposing. 
 
I. Burke on Smith’s Two Systems 
1.  The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
On April 12, 1759, David Hume wrote to Smith from London, informing Smith that he 
and Alexander Wedderburn had distributed copies of Smith’s newly published Theory of Moral 
Sentiments to ‘such of our acquaintances as we thought good judges and proper to spread the 
reputation of the book’. Among these is Burke, described as ‘an Irish gentleman, who wrote 
lately a very pretty treatise on the sublime’.
9 Smith’s response to Hume’s letter has not survived, 
but it seems that he expressed some interest in the ‘Irish Gentleman’. Hume describes him 
further in his next extant letter to Smith, from the following July 28. ‘I am very well acquainted 
with Burke’, he writes, ‘who was very much taken with your book. He got your direction [i.e., 
postal address] from me with a view of writing to you, and thanking you for your present, for I 
made it pass in your name. I wonder he has not done it’.
10  
Burke was not to write Smith until September 10, after he had returned to London. He 
explains his lateness in giving thanks to Smith for the copy of his ‘very agreeable and instructive 
work’ as stemming from a desire to ‘defer… [his] acknowledgements until I had read your book 
with proper care and attention’.
11 Burke then goes on to describe at some length the merits of the 
Theory. The following year, parallel arguments for the greatness of the work were made in an 
unsigned review for the second volume of Burke’s Annual Register, that for 1759.
12 Considering   4 
that Burke was not only editing the successful almanac at this time, but also writing almost all of 
its nearly 500 pages of content, it is a safe assumption that the review is Burke’s own; it has been 
universally identified as such in the literature.  
In his initial letter to Smith on the Theory, Burke writes that he is ‘not only pleased with 
the ingenuity of your theory’, but also ‘convinced of its solidity and truth’.
13 Rather than discuss 
the validity of any of Smith’s arguments in particular, however, Burke praises the soundness of 
its construction as a systematic whole. He writes: 
I have ever thought that the systems of morality were too contracted and that this science 
could never stand well upon any narrower basis than the whole of human nature. All the 
writers who have treated this subject before you were like those gothic architects who 
were fond of turning great vaults upon a single slender pillar; there is art in this, and there 
is a degree of ingenuity without doubt; but it is not sensible, and it cannot long be 
pleasing. A theory like yours, founded on the nature of man, which is always the same, 
will last, when those that are founded on his opinions, which are always changing, are 
gone and forgotten.
14 
 
Note that Burke believes Smith’s method to not only ground his moral system on a 
stronger foundation than all other such systems, but also to render it more ‘pleasing’. Burke 
devotes the rest of his letter to Smith to the praise, not of Smith’s philosophical acuity, but of his 
literary skill. Smith makes expert use of ‘easy and happy illustrations from common life’; he 
provides an ‘elegant painting of the manners and passions’; his prose style is ‘lively’ and ‘well 
varied’.
15 Burke even makes use of the categories of his own aesthetic theory to analyze the 
appeal of Smith’s work – in which beauty is understood as a source of love and joy arising from 
ordered harmony, and sublimity as a source of delight and awe arising from glorious power. Not 
only does the Theory show countless ‘beauties’, Burke writes, but it also ‘is often sublime too, 
particularly in that fine picture of the Stoic philosophy… which is dressed out in all the grandeur 
and pomp that becomes that magnificent delusion’.
16 If Smith’s literary achievement bears any 
flaws, it is ‘rather a little too diffuse’, though this is ‘a fault of the generous kind’.
17    5 
In his review of the Theory for the Annual Register, Burke continues his effusive praise 
of the book along these same aesthetic lines. He begins by questioning a reviewer’s ability to 
‘give the reader a proper idea of this excellent work’.
18 Burke rhapsodizes: 
A dry abstract of the system would convey no juster idea of it, than the skeleton of a 
departed beauty would of her form when she was alive; at the same time the work is so 
well methodized, the parts grow so naturally and gracefully out of each other, that it 
would be doing it equal injustice to show it by broken and detached pieces.
19 
 
After insisting that the only possible solution is for the reader of his review to purchase a 
copy of Smith’s book, Burke then goes on to praise, not only the work’s beauty (though he 
continues to insist it presents ‘one of the most beautiful fabrics of moral theory, that has perhaps 
ever appeared’
20) but also the book’s ‘ingenious novelty’.
21 Such praise may strike the 
contemporary ear as strange coming from the author who was to become Britain’s most famous 
defender of the old against the new, and Burke indeed maintains that ‘with regard to morals, 
nothing could be more dangerous’ than sheer novelty.
22 Smith avoids this danger, however, 
because his philosophical system ‘is in all its essential parts just, and founded on truth and 
nature’.
23 The review, as was customary in the eighteenth century, then provides an extended 
quotation from the work being discussed. Burke selects ‘the first section, as it concerns 
sympathy, the basis of his [Smith’s] theory; and as it exhibits equally with any of the rest, and 
idea of his style and manner’.
24  
 
2. The Wealth of Nations 
While Burke and Smith by now had certainly established an intellectual camaraderie 
based on their published work and personal correspondence, there is no indication that the two 
men met in person at any time for nearly two decades. This is reason alone to doubt the 
traditional tale that Smith consulted Burke and paid great deference to his opinions during the   6 
composition of the Wealth of Nations. Jacob Viner traces this tradition to the editor’s preface to 
the posthumous Thoughts and Details.
25 Viner, however, argues that this story is improbable 
considering that on the basis of what is known about Smith’s and Burke’s respective activities, 
the earliest they could have met in person would have been in London late in 1775, only a few 
months before the Wealth was published.
26 It was at this time that Smith was elected to the 
London literary institution known as ‘The Club’, of which Burke was an original member. Smith 
attended his first meeting on December 1, 1775, and probably attended semi-regularly through 
the publication of the Wealth in April of the following year.
27 It is almost certain that Smith and 
Burke met in the capital sometime before Smith left London shortly after the publication of the 
Wealth in April of 1776, though some have suggested that the meeting took place only upon 
Smith’s return to London early in 1777.
28  
The review of The Wealth of Nations in that year’s Annual Register closely parallels 
Burke’s earlier review of Smith’s Theory in terms of both style and content. The latter review 
begins with the observation that while ‘the growth and decay of nations’ has ‘sometimes 
exercised the speculations of the politician’ the subject has ‘seldom been considered… by the 
philosopher’.
29 It then goes on to compare Smith’s work favorably with the writings of the 
physiocratic school of ‘French economical writers’, lauding the Wealth for its unparalleled 
‘sagacity and penetration of mind, extent of views, accurate distinction, just and natural 
connection and dependence of parts’ and its completeness as a systematic ‘analysis of society’.
30 
The review even makes the same criticism of the Wealth that Burke earlier made of the Theory, 
that it ‘may be sometimes thought diffuse’, though it excuses this literary fault by noting that ‘the 
work is didactic, [and] that the author means to teach, and teach things that are not obvious’.
31   7 
Like the review of the Theory, the piece then concludes with an extended quotation, in this 
instance, Smith’s entire introduction to the Wealth.
32 
It is uncertain what role, if any, Burke himself played in the composition of this review. 
While some scholars have attributed it to Burke, others have questioned this attribution.
33 Burke 
had certainly relinquished control of the Annual Register by this time, though he continued to 
write book reviews and to provide editorial guidance. The Register’s review of the Wealth in 
1776 is so similar to that of the Theory in 1759, however, that we can have some confidence that 
it is an accurate reflection of Burke’s position on the work, even if it was not composed by him 
directly.  
In the years between the publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776 and Smith’s death 
in 1790, Burke and Smith maintained an active correspondence. Smith repeatedly expressed 
support for Burke’s practical political work, and Burke repeatedly expressed his admiration for 
Smith as a sagacious philosopher.
34 After Smith’s death, in his 1796 Letter to a Noble Lord, 
Burke claimed to ‘have made political economy an object of my humble studies from my very 
early youth to near the end of my service in Parliament’.
35 Burke takes considerable pride in the 
fact that ‘great and learned’ political economists ‘thought my studies were not wholly thrown 
away, and deigned to communicate with me now and then on some particulars of their immortal 
works’.
36 Smith was certainly foremost among those political economists to whom Burke could 
have been referring. 
  
II. Smith on System 
1. The Aesthetic Appeal of System   8 
Before he abandoned the life of the philosopher for that of the statesman, the young 
Burke was widely hailed as a savant in the field of philosophical aesthetics. Yet even those well 
aware of Burke’s aesthetic predilections must be surprised to find Burke praising Smith’s work 
primarily through the categories of the sublime and beautiful rather than those of the true and the 
good. Burke was only speaking metaphorically when he described Smith’s prose as ‘rather 
painting than writing’ and yet he consistently describes moral philosophy and political economy 
of what now seems a dry and technical nature as if they were works of art.
37 Nor can this striking 
feature of Burke’s reviews be merely attributed to the conventions of his time, in contrast to 
those of ours. Although aesthetic criteria were more often used when assessing philosophical 
works in the eighteenth century than they are today, the almost exclusively aesthetic emphasis in 
this review is unusual, both among eighteenth-century book reviews in general and among the 
reviews in Burke’s Annual Register in particular. To cite just one obvious example, Burke’s 
review of Rousseau’s Letter to D’Alembert – which immediately precedes his review of Smith’s 
Theory – does not take this aesthetic approach, instead engaging in a substantive critique of 
Rousseau’s arguments against the theater.
38 
Smith himself was well aware that aesthetic considerations can play an important role in 
science and philosophy, terms which he uses interchangeably for the construction of explanatory 
systems. Smith makes note of this fact in his posthumously published essay on ‘The Principles 
Which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries as Illustrated by the History of Astronomy’.  ‘A 
[philosophical] system’, Smith writes, ‘is an imaginary machine invented to connect together in 
the fancy those different movements and effects which are already in reality performed’.
39 Some 
explanatory systems, though, are created with ‘a more simple and intelligible as well as more 
beautiful machinery’ than others.
40 Typically, scientific systems are created to dispel the   9 
unpleasant sensation of ignorant awe one feels upon contemplating the unexplained. Yet an 
especially well-crafted scientific theory, with its ‘novelty and unexpectedness’ may itself become 
a sublime object of wonder, if not outright awe. Such was the case with Copernican astronomy, 
which ‘excited more wonder and surprise than the strangest of those appearances, which it had 
been invented to render natural and familiar, and these sentiments still more endeared it [to 
humanity]’.
41 
  Smith’s two great systems – the system of sympathy as the foundation of ethical life and 
the system of natural liberty that would, if realized, maximize the wealth of nations – are both 
designed to so endear themselves to our aesthetic sensibilities. The author’s system of political 
economy in particular makes use of complex mechanics of ingeniousness perhaps even 
surpassing those of Copernican or Newtonian astronomy.
42 The paradoxical power of the 
invisible hand to guide the pursuit of private interests so as to maximize the wealth of all is 
perhaps the single most striking element of Smith’s system, and hence the one most closely 
embraced by the mass of his readers. Smith dismissively attributes the popularity of physiocratic 
economics precisely to the fact that ‘men are fond of paradoxes, and of appearing to understand 
what surpasses the comprehension of ordinary people’.
43 Smith was surely aware, however, that 
the same cause would lead to the popularity of his own economic theory. 
   
2. The Danger of System 
Over the course of his intellectual development, Smith came to see the beauty and 
sublimity of imaginary, philosophical systems, not only as a source of aesthetic delight, but also 
as a source of considerable danger. He outlined this position in a small section of Part VI of the 
Theory, the entirety of which was added to the work for the sixth and final edition of 1790, the   10 
year of Smith’s death. Smith’s analysis of the dangers of systemic thinking is part of a larger 
discussion of political loyalties, for it is only with regard to systems describing the interactions 
among human beings that this frightening phenomenon arises. The excessive love of system in 
natural philosophy is basically harmless; perhaps its worst effect is the rather absurd cult of the 
scientist that formed at the altar of the deceased Newton. Yet the intellectual systems of a moral 
philosopher, unlike those of a natural scientist, describe imaginary social systems, and a moral 
philosopher can never remain wholly satisfied as long as the utopia in his imagination has not 
been actualized as a social reality. In this way, ‘a certain spirit of system’ can inflame ‘even to 
the madness of fanaticism’ the reformist drive of an opposition party, as its members become 
‘intoxicated with the imaginary beauty of… [some] ideal system, of which they have no 
experience, but which has been presented to them in all the most dazzling colors in which the 
eloquence of their leaders could paint it’.
44  
The man of system, the unholy union of the philosopher and the politician, is to be 
contrasted with the prudent statesman. The statesman, ‘prompted altogether by humanity and 
benevolence’, will, in reforming the ills of society, ‘content himself with moderating, what he 
cannot annihilate without great violence… When he cannot establish the right, he will not 
disdain to ameliorate the wrong; but like Solon, when he cannot establish the best system of 
laws, he will endeavor to establish the best that the people can bear’.
45 The man of system, 
however, is ‘often so enamored with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, 
that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part of it’. The result is that a society 
governed by men of system will function ‘miserably’ and ‘at all times in the highest degree of 
disorder’.
46 Blind to the defects in his idealized plan, the man of system cannot see the suffering 
its enactment will cause.
47   11 
 
III. The Statesman and the Philosopher  
1. Burke as a Prudent Statesman 
There is reason to believe that Smith was thinking of Burke as he contrasted the prudent 
statesman with the man of system. While constantly working to enact practical improvements in 
the body politic, Burke always insisted that radical political change according to philosophical 
schemes of perfection was to be entirely avoided. There is more direct evidence that Smith 
thought of Burke as a model statesman when the passages in the Theory on the subject are 
considered in conjunction with a certain relevant section of the Wealth. At the end of a chapter 
on the corn trade in that latter work, Smith discusses a law Burke had marshaled through the 
House of Commons in 1773, reforming but hardly eliminating bounties for the export of grain.
48 
Smith argues that Burke’s bill ‘seems to have established a system with regard to the Corn Laws, 
in many respects better than the ancient one, but in one or two respects perhaps not quite so 
good’.
49 In the first edition of the Wealth, this chapter then concluded with a critique of Burke’s 
reform. For the second edition of 1778, however, Smith added an additional paragraph at the 
very end of the chapter: 
So far, therefore, this law seems to be inferior to the ancient system. With all its 
imperfections, however, we may perhaps say of it what was said of the laws of Solon, 
that, though not the best in itself, it is the best which the interests, prejudices, and temper 
of the times would admit of. It may perhaps in due time prepare the way for a better.
50 
  
Smith, then was thinking specifically of a reform championed by Burke when he referred 
to Solon’s laws in the 1778 edition of the Wealth, good evidence that he was also thinking of 
Burke when he made an identical reference twelve years later in the 1790 edition of the Theory. 
It is probably not a coincidence that Smith seems to have first made Burke’s personal 
acquaintance sometime between the composition of the Wealth and its revisions for the second   12 
edition, which suggests that the statesman himself may have objected to Smith’s critique of his 
1773 reforms. Such, at least, is the tradition preserved in an 1804 article by Francis Horner. After 
discussing Smith’s statements on the laws of Solon, Horner observes that the philosopher 
‘probably bore in mind when he used these expressions, the answer which Mr. Burke had made 
to him, on being reproached for not effecting a thorough repeal’.
51 Burke, with his usual gift for 
metaphor, is reported to have argued, ‘that it was the privilege of philosophers to conceive their 
diagrams in geometrical accuracy; but the engineer must often impair the symmetry, as well as 
the simplicity of his machine, in order to overcome the irregularities of friction and resistance’.
52 
There is another account of Burke addressing Smith on the differing natures of 
philosophy and statesmanship quoted in the papers of Thomas Jefferson. ‘You, Dr. Smith, from 
your professor’s chair, may send forth theories upon freedom of commerce as if you were 
lecturing on pure mathematics’, Burke is reported as saying. ‘But legislators must proceed by 
slow degrees, impeded as they are in their course by the friction of interest and the fiction of 
preference’.
53 Regardless of whether Burke expressed such a position to Smith sometime 
between 1776 and 1778, however, he certainly adhered to this view concerning the respective 
social positions of the pair. ‘A statesman differs from a professor in a university’, the MP wrote. 
‘The latter has only the general view of society; the former, the statesman, has a number of 
circumstances to combine with those general ideas, and to take into consideration’.
54  
 
2. Smith as a Systematic Philosopher 
If Burke is the model of a prudent statesman, then Smith must consider himself as (at 
least attempting to be) the model of a true philosopher, and certainly not a man of system. Such 
philosophers are in a difficult position. It is not enough that they themselves resist the spirit of   13 
system; they must also help their followers avoid this danger. Nonetheless, it is still the 
philosopher’s responsibility to provide the ideals toward which societies must strive. As much as 
he feared the man of system, Smith also saw that ‘the same principle, the same love of system, 
the same regard to the beauty of order, of art, and contrivance’ that so intoxicates such an 
individual also ‘frequently serves to recommend those institutions which tend to promote the 
public welfare’.
55 After all, the vast majority of the projects of humanity began as imaginary 
systems in the mind of some philosophical designer, and these plans were made into reality 
through the work of others acting out of a commitment to this imagined machine. The realization 
of Smith’s system of natural liberty, however, requires less the action than the inaction of 
humanity, or at least of humanity’s governmental institutions.
56 In systematically presenting the 
mechanisms of the natural economic order, Smith thus turns the love of system against itself.  
This system of natural liberty, moreover, while remaining a source of ideals for the 
orientation of political action, is itself riddled with numerous flaws.
57 It is beyond the scope of 
this essay to detail these many imperfections – from the dehumanizing alienation of the working 
class, to an ultimate end to economic growth. Nonetheless, his foregrounding of the many flaws 
in this system is evidence that Smith was capable of designing a model social order while 
immunizing both himself and his readers from the intoxicating effects of imagined perfection.  
Indeed, Smith repeatedly cautions his reader that the total realization of even this 
imperfect utopia may be practically impossible. Smith’s discussion of Burke’s reform of the 
Corn Laws can certainly be read as an admission that it may be infeasible to legislate the 
immediate adoption of perfectly free trade. Elsewhere, Smith is even more explicit on the matter. 
‘To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain’, 
the philosopher writes, ‘is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be   14 
established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but what is much more unconquerable, the 
private interests of many individuals, irresistibly oppose it’.
58 Even if it were politically feasible 
to actualize Smith’s still imperfect utopian vision instantly and immediately, it would 
nonetheless not be economically feasible to do so. One of ‘the unfortunate effects of all the 
regulations of the mercantile system’, Smith writes, is to ‘not only introduce very dangerous 
disorders into the state of the body politick, but disorders which it is often difficult to remedy, 
without occasioning, for a time at least, still greater disorders’.
59 
In short, the refusal to directly apply philosophical systems to political decision-making 
is a central element of Smith’s nonetheless highly systematic thought. James Boswell reportedly 
marveled at the strangeness of this seemingly anti-philosophical philosophy. ‘Mr. Smith’, 
Boswell recounts, ‘wrote to me some time ago, ‘Your great fault is acting upon system’. What a 
curious reproof to a young man from a grave philosopher! It is, however, a just one, and but too 
well founded with respect to me’.
60 It is certainly possible that Burke sometimes acted for Smith 
as Smith himself acted for Boswell, serving to help warn the philosopher against the dangers of 
system. 
 
IV. Men of System 
1. Richard Price and the French Revolutionaries as Men of System 
Smith’s discussion of the man of system in the Theory is immediately preceded by 
arguments concerning the alteration of a nation’s constitution and the loyalty one owes to one’s 
fatherland and its existing regime. Here, Smith argues that ‘the love of our own country seems 
not to be derived from the love of mankind’, adopting a thesis directly contrary to Richard 
Price’s in the radical Dissenter’s November 4, 1789 sermon, ‘A Discourse on The Love of Our   15 
Country’.
61 It was in response to this sermon that Burke composed his 1790 masterpiece 
Reflections on the Revolution in France. While Burke makes it clear that he is directly 
addressing Price’s sermon, however, Smith does not. There is, moreover, some reason to believe 
that Smith was unaware of Price’s sermon when composing these passages. While the sixth 
edition of the Theory was not printed until January 1790, the papers of Smith’s friend Thomas 
Cadell record that Smith finished ‘the very last sentence’ of his revisions to the work on 
November 18, 1789.
62 It is unlikely that Price’s text of November 4 would have reached Smith in 
Edinburgh in time for him to have composed a refutation of the speech a mere two weeks later.  
Smith, however, was certainly aware of Price’s earlier work, and displayed an antipathy 
toward the radical Dissenter almost as great as Burke’s own. ‘Price’s speculations cannot fail to 
sink into the neglect that they always deserved’, Smith wrote in a 1785 letter to George 
Chalmers. ‘I have always considered him as a factious citizen, a most superficial philosopher and 
by no means an able calculator’.
63 Regardless of whether Smith was directly addressing either 
the French Revolution or Price’s sermon in the sixth edition of the Theory, it is undeniable he 
was adding his views to the debate of the day on the constitutions of nations, and that his 
position was at least sympathetic to that later adopted by Burke in the Reflections.
64 
 Certainly, the Reflections paints the French revolutionaries and their British 
sympathizers as men of system of the type we have seen denounced by Smith. ‘They conceive, 
very systematically’, the statesman writes, ‘that all things which give perpetuity are mischievous, 
and therefore they are at inexpiable war with all establishments. They think that government may 
vary like modes of dress, and with as little ill effect’.
65 It is therefore that the revolutionaries feel 
free to rebuild society to conform with their rationalistic conception of the rights of man. The 
resulting behavior of the ‘abettors of this philosophic system’ inevitably devolves into ‘frauds,   16 
impostures, violences, rapines, burnings, murders, confiscations, compulsory paper currencies, 
and every description of tyranny and cruelty to bring about and to uphold this Revolution’.
66 
In his rhetorically overheated attack, Burke never makes a general, philosophical case 
against the man of system, and freely mixes general denunciations of philosophically systematic 
politics with specific arguments against the particular utopian system advanced by the 
revolutionaries of his day. ‘In the system itself’, Burke writes of the constitution put forward by 
the French National Assembly, ‘I confess myself unable to find out anything which displays in a 
single instance the work of a comprehensive and disposing mind or even the provisions of a 
vulgar prudence’.
67 Later, the statesman rails against the ‘imbecility… of the puerile and 
pedantic system, which they [i.e., the National Assembly] call a constitution’.
68 So flawed is the 
new regime in its design, that Burke questions whether it even ‘deserves such a name’ as 
‘system’ at all.
69  
While this attack on the French constitution may function quite well rhetorically, it serves 
to undermine any more general attack on the man of system. As Smith recognized, it is not the 
flaws, but the very perfection of utopian political systems that renders them so dangerous. Burke, 
too, recognizes that ‘in a new and merely theoretic system, it is expected that every contrivance 
shall appear, on the face of it, to answer its ends, especially where the projectors are no way 
embarrassed with an endeavor to accommodate the new building to an old one, either in the 
walls or on the foundations’.
70 Burke argues, of course, that the new French constitution fails in 
this regard, but in doing so he weakens his argument that even a perfect philosophical system 
ought not to be actualized through sudden, revolutionary change. Burke, however, wishes to 
portray the revolutionaries of his day as villains or fools, and hence could not admit the truth if 
they were in fact merely misguided lovers of beauty, blinded by the philosophical genius of their   17 
utopian dreams. Smith, who has no such ideological axe to grind, is free to present a more 
sympathetic, and hence also more realistic, portrait of the revolutionary man of system, a 
character who the philosopher nonetheless denounces as surely as does Burke. 
Indeed, throughout his discussion of patriotism, the constitutions of nations, and 
(perhaps) Price, Smith adopts a far more moderate position than does Burke. After establishing 
that the love of country has a different source from the love of humanity, Smith sees that the 
former sentiment ‘seems, in ordinary cases, to involve in it two different principles; first, a 
certain respect and reverence for that constitution or form of government which is actually 
established; and secondly, an earnest desire to render the condition of our fellow-citizens as safe, 
respectable and happy as we can’. Fortunately, ‘in peaceable and quiet times, those two 
principles generally coincide’, for the maintenance of the established regime will be the best 
means of promoting the welfare of the citizenry. ‘But in times of public discontent, faction and 
disorder, those two different principles may draw different ways’. The decision as to whether to 
dismantle a nation’s system of government completely, of course, requires ‘the highest effort of 
political wisdom’. The statesmen who chooses correctly has the opportunity to ‘assume the 
greatest and noblest of all characters, that of the reformer and legislator of a great state’.
71 It is 
only after his praise of the great legislator that Smith launches his analysis of the man of system, 
thus robbing this analysis of any rhetorical force it might have in condemning the revolutionaries 
of the day. 
Smith’s dispassionate analysis and Burke’s partisan speechifying are characteristic 
rhetorical modes of the philosopher and the politician, respectively. Smith is engaged in the 
rational construction of model social systems, while Burke is rallying his fellow citizens to 
action, and this divergence in purpose serves to alter the very nature of the thought conveyed.   18 
Smith, concerned with the consistency and completeness of his philosophical investigations, 
offers a highly systematic refutation of acting upon system. Burke, striving to corral all possible 
arguments in support of his position into a single, rhetorically effective package, constructs a 
powerful, if haphazard and often contradictory case, a case which is anything but systematic.  
Thomas Paine, in his 1791 response to Burke, argued that the statesman not only refused 
to engage in systematic thinking, but was also incapable of doing so. Paine argues that Burke, as 
a brilliant orator but a second-rate philosopher, was unable to see the wise order provided by the 
constitution put forth by the French National Assembly. Interestingly, Paine contrasts Burke with 
a philosopher of the day famed for observing the hidden order underlying political and social 
phenomena. Paine writes: 
Had Mr. Burke possessed talents similar to the author of On the Wealth of Nations, he 
would have comprehended all the parts which enter into, and, by assemblage, form a 
constitution… It is not from his prejudices only, but from the disorderly cast of his 
genius, that he is unfitted for the subject he writes upon. Even his genius is without a 
constitution. It is a genius at random, and not a genius constituted.
72 
 
The works of Burke and Smith, according to Paine, both display aesthetic brilliance in 
their critiques of acting upon system, but aesthetic brilliance of very different sorts, 
corresponding to the primary categories of Burke’s own aesthetic theory. The beauty of the 
Theory and the Wealth is akin to that found in the ordered harmony of classical architecture, and 
is greeted with joy and love for the systems constructed therein. The sublimity of the Reflections 
is akin to that of a bombastic tragedy, and is greeted with weeping and the gnashing of teeth. 
Both such forms of aesthetic achievement have their dangers. Smith’s philosophy could 
potentially give rise to men of system who pursue natural economic liberty in a radical manner 
never intended by the author, and the staid professor took great steps to inoculate his readers 
against this utopian madness throughout his books. Burke’s oratory, for its part, might beget   19 
counter-revolutionary fanatics with an unreasonable and unreasoning fear of change. It is not 
evident that Burke was aware of the threat to human welfare posed by his own work, as Smith 
was undoubtedly aware of the threat posed by his.
73  
 
2. Burke as a Man of System 
Adam Smith died the same year that Burke published the Reflections, so it is impossible 
to say whether the philosopher would have been moved by his friend’s rhetoric. Burke, however, 
was clearly moved by Smith’s philosophy, both in the field of ethics and that of political 
economy. The historical evidence also indicates that the statesman continued to embrace Smith’s 
economic doctrines with considerable enthusiasm throughout his career.  
  The fullest statement of Burke’s economic views was not composed until late 1795, less 
than two years before his death; it was published posthumously in 1800 as Thoughts and Details 
on Scarcity. Here, Burke argues against any interference in the market to counteract rising food 
prices – be they regulations of the trade in grain, the establishment of public granaries, minimum 
wage laws, or even direct payments to supplement the wages of laborers of the sort first enacted 
in Speenhamland at this time. While Smith himself did not address the possibility of a policy 
akin to that in Speenhamland, he did argue against regulation of the trade in food staples, even 
during times of scarcity. ‘The unlimited, unrestrained freedom of the corn trade’, Smith 
maintained, ‘is the only effectual preventative of the miseries of a famine’, as well as ‘the best 
palliative of the inconveniences of a dearth; for the inconveniences of a real scarcity cannot be 
remedied; they can only be palliated’.
74 Burke certainly provides arguments against 
Speenhamland-type programs along these Smithian lines, maintaining that redistribution of 
wealth would impede the efficient operations of self-interest, and that interfering in the   20 
operations of the market is generally an ineffective choice of policy. ‘Such is the event of all 
compulsory equalizations’, Burke writes. ‘They pull down what is above; they never raise what 
is below; and they depress high and low together beneath the level of what was originally the 
lowest’.
75 It is not necessary here to evaluate the validity of Burke’s argument that even a 
temporary redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor would prove deleterious to the 
material welfare of all, though this argument does demonstrate that Burke possessed more than a 
moderate facility for political economy in the Smithian mold. 
It is critical to note, however, that Burke also includes a second line of argument against 
Speenhamland-type policies independent of their ineffectiveness, a deontological moral 
argument grounded in natural theology. ‘We, the people’, Burke piously proclaims, ‘ought to be 
made sensible that it is not in breaking the laws of commerce, which are the laws of Nature, and 
consequently the laws of God, that we are to place our hope of softening the Divine displeasure 
to remove any calamity under which we suffer or which hangs over us’.
76 With a single 
rhetorical flourish, Burke has transformed scientific, positive laws with no more moral weight 
than the laws of physics into divine commands whose violation is a grave sin. Christian charity, 
Burke acknowledges, is also God’s law, but with such admittedly obligatory acts of mercy ‘the 
magistrate has nothing at all to do; his interference is a violation of the property which it is his 
office to protect’. While feeding the poor is the duty of all, ‘the manner, mode, time, choice of 
objects, and proportion [of charitable donation] are left to private discretion; and perhaps for that 
very reason it is performed with the greater satisfaction, because the discharge has more the 
appearance of freedom’.
77 That is, even if a magistrate were able to design some scheme of 
payments to the poor during times of famine which would prevent their starvation effectively and   21 
efficiently, he would be morally wrong to do so, as he would be acting contrary to the will of 
God. 
 Such theological arguments could not be further from Smith’s own views.
78 Never in the 
Wealth does Smith describe the laws of commerce given free reign under the system of natural 
liberty as possessing any moral authority independent of their uncanny ability to maximize the 
wealth of nations to the benefit of all. Indeed, talk of God and divine law, while still present in 
the Theory, has been entirely excluded from Smith’s later work, and nowhere in any of his 
writings does the philosopher ever indicate that the laws of commerce carry some supernatural 
sanction.  
To the contrary, Smith gives several examples of circumstances in which it will advance 
the common good for a magistrate to interfere with the free operation of the market. A 
government official ‘may prescribe rules, therefore, which, not only prohibit mutual injuries 
among fellow-citizens, but command mutual good offices to a certain degree’, though ‘it requires 
the greatest delicacy and reserve’ to lay down such laws ‘with propriety and judgment’.
79 For 
example, although Smith called for a reform of existing ‘poor laws’, which had required 
localities to provide aid to the indigent since Elizabethan times, he nowhere called for their 
wholesale abolition.
80 The criterion according to which such policies are to be judged is not its 
conformity with divinely ordained laws of the market, but rather their ability to improve the 
welfare of the populace. ‘No society can surely be flourishing and happy’, Smith memorably 
insisted, ‘of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable’.
81 
In pursuing the welfare of the people, moreover, the prudent statesman must be willing to 
defer to popular opinion as necessary. And nowhere is this more necessary, Smith argued, than 
with regard to the people’s very sustenance and survival. ‘The people feel themselves so much   22 
interested in what relates either to their subsistence in this life, or to their happiness in a life to 
come, that government must yield to their prejudices, and, in order to preserve the public 
tranquility, establish that system that they approve of’.
82 There is thus reason to believe that, had 
he lived to see the sharp rise in food prices in the second half of the 1790’s, Smith might have 
advocated accommodating popular demands for a governmental response.
83 Yet Burke seems to 
reject, not only any new response to sudden scarcity, but even the existing scheme of poor laws. 
He rejects them, independent of their consequences, as a kind of blasphemy, a wanton flouting of 
the divine laws of the free market.  
Burke’s description of the laws of commerce as normatively binding laws of God, a 
description never intended by Smith, cannot be explained as simply the tendency of a religious 
man to see the hand of God at play in fields addressed in a secular manner by irreligious 
scientists. After all, a religion must select which natural phenomena are to be given moral 
authority as the work of its deity, and which are to be rejected as the work of chance, chaos, or 
even Satan himself. From a Christian perspective, as C.B. Macpherson observes, ‘that the 
capitalist order is part of the divine and natural order is not self-evident; indeed, at least until the 
end of the sixteenth century, most writers and preachers would have treated it as nonsense’.
84 J. 
R. Poynter sees such a view as highly uncommon even at the end of the eighteenth century, and 
argues that ‘Burke’s tract resembles the lesser writings of the generation after Malthus rather 
than its contemporaries’.
85   
It seems, then, that Burke could not imagine that the machinery of commerce described 
by Smith was anything other than the handiwork of God. Only an artist of divine sublimity could 
be responsible for a system of such overpowering aesthetic power. Burke thus insisted that this 
imaginary system be actualized, regardless of the human suffering that such a project might   23 
cause. Here, the proper roles of the philosopher and the statesman are reversed, with the 
philosopher advocating political caution, the statesman becoming enamored with the perfection 
of an imagined ideal.
86 This is a classic example of the madness of system that Smith so 
accurately described in the last edition of the Theory. Although it may come a surprise to many 
that Edmund Burke, of all people, would fall prey to this particular folly, it is one to which those 
who judge works of social science and moral philosophy according to aesthetic rather than 
ethical criteria are all too prone.
87  Had Smith lived to see Burke’s overheated economic essay, 
the prudent Scottish philosopher might have repeated the warning he gave Boswell against acting 
upon system. Considering the brilliant and impassioned attack on such behavior in his own 
writings, Burke might have heeded his friend’s warning well. 
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